The place of human rights and the common good in global health policy by Tasioulas, John & Vayena, Effy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1007/s11017-016-9372-x
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Tasioulas, J., & Vayena, E. (2016). The place of human rights and the common good in global health policy.
THEORETICAL MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS, 37(4), 365-382. 10.1007/s11017-016-9372-x
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 18. Feb. 2017
The place of human rights and the common good
in global health policy
John Tasioulas1 • Effy Vayena2
Published online: 1 August 2016
 The Author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This article offers an integrated account of two strands of global health
justice: health-related human rights and health-related common goods. After
sketching a general understanding of the nature of human rights, it proceeds to
explain both how individual human rights are to be individuated and the content of
their associated obligations specified. With respect to both issues, the human right to
health is taken as the primary illustration. It is argued that (1) the individuation of
the right to health is fixed by reference to the subject matter of its corresponding
obligations, and not by the interests it serves, and (2) the specification of the content
of that right must be properly responsive to thresholds of possibility and burden. The
article concludes by insisting that human rights cannot constitute the whole of
global health justice and that, in addition, other considerations—including the
promotion of health-related global public goods—should also shape such policy.
Moreover, the relationship between human rights and common goods should not be
conceived as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, there sometimes exists an indi-
vidual right to some aspect of a common good, including a right to benefit from
health-related common goods such as programmes for securing herd immunity from
diphtheria.
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What are the demands of justice applicable to global health policy? By global health
policy we mean those practical measures, whether adopted and implemented by
international organizations, states, corporations, or agents of some other kind, that
have as their ultimate goal, in the words of the World Health Organization’s
evocative motto, ‘‘health for all.’’ They are legal and other measures aimed at
protecting and promoting the interest in health of every human being around the
globe. In keeping with a long philosophical tradition, we deploy two distinct senses
of the idea of justice. According to the first, justice concerns moral duties that are
owed to and claimable by others as a matter of individual rights. In another, broader
sense, justice concerns moral duties governing our conduct towards others,
especially insofar as they fall within the proper remit of public decision-making.1
The second sense of justice, the domain of other-regarding moral duties, includes
the first sense, the domain of justice as rights, as a component. But it also includes
other moral duties, notably duties to preserve and promote the common good that
may not be linked to rights.
Transposed to the global context, justice, to a significant degree, consists in the
morality of individual human rights and global common goods. To this extent, a
justice perspective on global health policy must be bifocal in character. However,
we contend that it is a profound error, if also a common one, to construe the two
strands of justice as being in an inherently dichotomous and generally antagonistic
relationship. Not only do we need to draw on both human rights and common goods,
but the ‘individualism’ of human rights is not to be starkly juxtaposed against the
‘collectivism’ of the common good. On the contrary, human rights are an integral
component of some global common goods. This article seeks to make a start on
elaborating the meaning and implications of such an integrated, bifocal perspective
in relation to global health policy.2
We begin, in the first section, by outlining the distinctive character of human
rights: they are moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue of their
humanity. Then, in light of the prominent role of human rights in global health
policy debates, the next two sections focus on the human right to health. One
important question is how that right is to be individuated within the overall set of
human rights. Contrary to a popular, radically ‘inclusive’ interpretation, we suggest
characterizing the human right to health’s scope of concern primarily by reference
to obligations regarding health care services and public health measures. This way
of understanding the human right to health makes it clear that it is only one among a
number of human rights that serve our interest in health and to which global health
policy needs to be responsive. We then offer an account of how to specify the
content of the human right to health, i.e., the content of the duties regarding health
care services and public health measures associated with the right. The process of
content specification, we argue, involves the application of a threshold criterion that
incorporates considerations of possibility and burden. In the fourth section, we
1 For these two senses of justice, see Finnis’s discussion [1].
2 An important thrust of the human rights campaign in relation to the AIDS pandemic pioneered by
Jonathan Mann was to reject ‘the prevailing view… that individual-centered human rights conflicted with
community-oriented public health’ [2, p. 245]. This article aims to contribute to this attractive
integrationist view by deepening its philosophical basis.
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explain why human rights cannot do all the work in shaping a just global health
policy, giving special attention to the crucial role of health-related global common
goods. We also respond to the converse hypothesis that global policy must be
predominantly concerned with common goods as opposed to human rights. This
response turns on showing how common goods may include, as a component,
arrangements that secure human rights.
Introducing human rights
Global health policy advocates have repeatedly called for a post-2015 development
agenda that gives a prominent place to policy objectives couched in the language of
human rights. These calls echo the chorus of agreement among a wide variety of
international actors—including the United Nations, NGOs, governments, and
ordinary citizens—on the vital importance of a human rights basis for the new
development goals more generally [3–5]. Charitably interpreted, as more than just a
rhetorical ploy intended to convey a sense of urgent commitment, this emphasis on
human rights embodies a vital insight. The adoption of goals simply concerned with
the promotion of human welfare—such as our interests in health, prosperity,
education, etc.—is not enough. Human rights inject a distinctive moral dimension
into policy objectives, one that is especially responsive to the plight of victims of
injustice throughout the globe.
The distinctive character of human rights consists in the fact that they are
universal moral rights: moral rights possessed by all human beings simply in virtue
of their humanity.3 They mark the threshold at which each individual human being’s
interests generate duties or obligations (we use these terms interchangeably) on the
part of others to respect, protect, and promote those interests in various ways. The
violation of an obligation is a moral wrong, whereas no wrong is committed simply
by thwarting another’s interests or leaving those interests unpromoted. For example,
neither beating a rival for a coveted job nor failing to donate your spare healthy
kidney for a transplant need be wrongful. Human rights are a distinctive moral
register of critical assessment, beyond assessments tracking rises and falls in
individual or collective welfare. The foregoing does not mean that wellbeing as
such, or elements of it such as the global burden of disease, lacks normative
significance. It is just to say that it cannot displace the distinctive kind of moral
assessment introduced by human rights: the idea of moral duties owed to each and
every human being, the violation of which specifically victimizes the right-holder.
Indeed, the discourse of human rights is at the core of a ‘global justice’ approach to
health: justice, on one historically influential interpretation, consists in the rights-
involving part of morality, and the sub-category of human rights are those moral
rights that are held globally because they are possessed by people simply in virtue of
their humanity.
3 For a general account of the nature of human rights relied on here, see [6]. This article offers a critique
of rival, ‘political’, interpretations of the concept of a human right offered by John Rawls, Charles Beitz,
and Joseph Raz.
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So far, we have spoken of human rights as a certain kind of moral norm. Of
course, there is now a firmly established doctrine of international human rights law
in which various health-related human rights form an integral part.4 Moreover, in
excess of two-thirds of national constitutions explicitly include health rights, often
by incorporating provisions in international human rights treaties [2, p. 263]. But the
morality of human rights is independent of its recognition by domestic or
international law. A right does not need to be actually legally enshrined, let alone
enforceable, to exist as a human right. On the contrary, human rights law is best
understood as deriving its distinct identity from the attempt to give legal effect to
background human rights morality, insofar as it is appropriate to do so. It is the
background morality of human rights that is the main focus of this chapter. Three
further preliminary observations are worth making in this connection.
First, the duties associated with human rights include positive duties to engage in
certain forms of conduct, such as the provision of health care services, as well as
negative duties to refrain from certain conduct, such as administering medical
treatment without consent. Moreover, the positive duties associated with a right may
be primary duties. In other words, they are duties that are not parasitic on other
duties associated with the right, such as positive duties to compensate or make
reparation triggered by a violation of some prior duty. Instead, human rights also
impose primary positive duties to make certain goods and services available to their
holders. Of course, there are special problems in the allocation of positive primary
duties to duty-bearers, and in the specification of their content, which do not arise in
the case of negative primary duties [8]. But these differences between the two kinds
of rights, which are largely matters of degree, do not warrant the wholesale
expulsion of so-called ‘socio-economic rights’, with positive primary duties, from
the category of bona fide human rights [9].
Second, there is no compelling a priori reason why the duties associated with
human rights should be thought to fall exclusively on states, at least as primary
duty-bearers. This idea is a distortion that a misplaced focus on legal instruments—
constitutions and treaties—has introduced into thinking about human rights. Instead,
we should maintain an open-minded and flexible attitude to the question of who the
relevant duty-bearers are in any given time and place [6, 10]. Multinational
corporations, international organizations, and even individuals can be directly
subject to human rights-related duties. Pharmaceutical companies, for example, may
be directly subject to human rights obligations to make antiretrovirals and other
drugs available to developing countries at a significantly lower cost than market
price [11]. In an environment of accelerating globalization, with a concomitant
decline of state power relative to various other global actors, the importance of not
conceptually restricting human rights obligations to states is all the more
pronounced. Indeed, precisely this insight is at the heart of the innovative UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which seek to provide an
authoritative specification of the human rights responsibilities directly applicable to
corporations [12].
4 For a fine study of the human right to health, see [7].
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Finally, another a priori commitment to be resisted is the idea that a pro tanto
case always exists for enshrining human rights as legal entitlements, let alone for
taking the further step of making them enforceable legal entitlements [6, 13]. Law is
a vitally important mechanism of implementation, but it remains one mechanism
alongside others, including social conventions, public opinion, and the inculcation
of a rights-respecting ethos through fostering the internalization of human rights
norms by individual and collective agents. As Sen has stressed, whether and to what
extent individual human rights should be enshrined in counterpart legal rights are a
matter of what is inherently appropriate and works in all the circumstances, which is
subject to considerable variation in time and place. Experience shows that making
human rights legally claimable is sometimes counter-productive. For example, in
Brazil the constitutionalization of the right to health appears to have facilitated a
transfer of health resources to wealthier members of society who can afford the cost
of litigation [14]. The overall health budget remained fixed, but the better-off
engaged in litigation against the government to siphon off a larger share of it for
themselves, often in order to treat less serious ailments.5 To take another example,
the economist Jeffrey Sachs, one of the chief architects of the Millennium
Development Goals (MDSs), has ascribed the success in meeting those goals partly
to the fact that states are not legally bound by them. This lowered the cost of states
publicly signing up to the goals in the first place, enhancing the likelihood that they
would do so [16]. In short, the difficult and multi-faceted question of legalization is
one that deserves extensive consideration on a case-by-case basis. No presumptive
answer to it is already inscribed in the very nature of human rights.
Individuation and inclusivity
Human rights exist insofar as universal human interests generate obligations on
others to respect, protect, and promote those interests in various ways. Interests are
here understood as the elements of wellbeing, the realization of which in a person’s
life make it a better life for them. We favour an objectivist and pluralistic account of
the interests that ground human rights [17]. They are interests human beings possess
independently of whether they actually desire their realization, and they are not
limited to one kind of interest—autonomy, for example—or to one category of
interests, such as those interests that qualify as basic needs [18]. Instead, a plurality
of genuinely universal human interests are capable of generating duties on the part
of others in the case of all human beings, simply in virtue of their humanity.
Moreover, essential to the rights-generative role of human interests is that they
belong to distinct individuals with equal moral status in virtue of their humanity: the
5 This need not be an inevitable consequence of legalization; cf. the South African Constitutional Court’s
decision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1997), where it was held that provision
of dialysis for a patient with chronic renal failure was not required by the constitutional right to health,
partly because this would prejudice the satisfaction of other health needs that have to be met out of the
state’s budget [15].
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status of human dignity. This is central to explaining the resistance of human rights
to trade-offs both against other rights and against non-rights based considerations.6
The pluralistic theory of human rights claims not only that a plurality of interests
is relevant to the justification of human rights generally but also that any given
individual human right is typically grounded in a plurality of interests, such as
autonomy, health, knowledge, friendship, accomplishment, play, etc. [17]. The right
not to be tortured, for example, is grounded not only in one’s interest in autonomy
but also in one’s interest in being free from pain and in being able to form intimate
and trusting relationships. This is also true of the human right to health: it serves not
only one’s interest in health but also various other interests that enjoying good
health can enable one to realize, such as making friends, acquiring understanding, or
accomplishing something with one’s life. Indeed, the right to health may even
include entitlements to medical services, such as non-therapeutic abortions or
cosmetic surgery, that are not primarily intended to serve the health interests of the
right-holder. Hence, a diversity of interests helps to justify the existence of a human
right to health and to shape its associated obligations.
One way to fall into the trap of assuming that the human right to health is
grounded exclusively in our interest in health is to adopt an unduly expansive
interpretation of health. This is precisely what the WHO did in the preamble to its
constitution, which notoriously states that ‘health is a state of complete physical,
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity’
[20]. But, as has been repeatedly shown, this definition is far too broad. Health, on
any remotely useful understanding, is one element of wellbeing among others, not
the whole of it. And this remains the case even though health bears pervasive
constitutive and instrumental relations to the other elements of wellbeing. For the
purposes of this article, we take health to be centrally concerned with the effective
functioning of standard human physical and mental capacities [21]. A person can
enjoy such functioning even when they are deficient in other elements of wellbeing,
such as accomplishment and enjoyment. Moreover, they may even reasonably put
their health at risk in order better to achieve some other aspect of wellbeing.
There is a further crucial point worth making about the individuation of the
human right to health. Although many familiar human rights serve our interest in
health in all sorts of important ways, this does not automatically render them
components of the general human right to health. Yet, such an overly inclusive
interpretation of the right to health has been advocated by the Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in its influential General Comment 14, as
well as by other UN organs and leading global health scholars [22]. So, for example,
Gostin notes that General Comment 14 treats as ‘integral components of the right to
health’ entitlements to food, housing, life, education, privacy, and access to
information. Gostin himself suggests that this specification is probably too
‘constrained’ and should be widened to include ‘gender equality, employment,
and social inclusion’ [2, p. 257]. This inclusive approach is echoed, and perhaps
taken even further, in a ‘Fact Sheet’ on the right to health jointly produced by the
WHO and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. According
6 For agency and needs-based accounts of human rights, see [11, 19].
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to this document, the human right to health incorporates a slew of other rights,
including gender equality and freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment [23, p. 3]. By a process parallel to the WHO’s
inflation of the notion of health to embrace all of human well-being, such
interpretations appear to absorb within the human right to health all the rights that
bear positively on our interest in health. Indeed, on this radically ‘inclusive’
approach, it is an open question, whether there is any right in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, or in any of the two leading Conventions on Human
Rights, which cannot be subsumed within the right to health, at least insofar as they
involve duties that serve the right-holder’s interest in health. After all, a colourable
story can be told of how denial of the rights to citizenship, political participation, a
fair trial, freedom of speech, religion, movement, and association, among others,
can have a seriously detrimental impact on health.
Now, something is clearly awry if the human right to health is lumbered with
such a bloated interpretation.7 The mistake is to individuate the scope of the right
simply by reference to whether a putative rights-based duty is justified, in part, by
whether it serves a person’s interest in health. Many, if not most, human rights serve
a person’s interest in health, and this is because they serve a multiplicity of interests,
including health. Consider, for example, the fact that improvements in adult
women’s education accounted for 40 % of the reduction in mortality between 1960
and 1990, although the steps taken to enhance educational provision are not
obviously ‘health care’ measures [24, p. 94]. However, a human right is not picked
out straightforwardly by the profile of interests it serves but, we claim, by reference
to the subject matter of the obligations it generates.
More specifically, our suggestion is that the right to health should be construed as
principally ranging over obligations concerned with the provision of health care
services by medical professionals and public health measures, such as sanitation,
potable water, clean air, alcohol, tobacco control, and so on. On this view, there is a
moderate sense in which the human right to health is an ‘inclusive’ right. It
‘includes’, as justified components, various more specific rights to health care or
public health measures, such as a right to health insurance or measles vaccination.
By contrast, however, many so-called ‘social determinants of health’, which are
crucial in promoting the health of individuals, do not come under the right to health.
Instead, determinants such as education, housing, employment, and a social
environment free of gender and racial discrimination—insofar as there is a right to
them—more plausibly fall under other rights. The rationale for excluding these
social determinants is partly a holistic one, turning on avoiding excessive overlaps
with other rights there is good reason to recognise as distinct rights. But there is also
a deeper rationale, which brings back the role of the interests served by the right in a
more sophisticated manner. This is whether or not the object to which one has a
right serves one’s interest in health as its primary and direct objective, as in the case
7 The upshot is so peculiar that one might wonder why radical inclusivism is so popular. Mindy Roseman
has suggested (in conversation) that it is sometimes viewed as a way of upholding the credentials of the
human right to health against those who are sceptical of ‘socio-economic’ human rights, by showing that
it incorporates traditional civil and political rights. Whatever its efficacy at the level of rhetoric, however,
this strategy offers no real defence of the positive primary duties associated with the right to health.
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of clean air and water, or whether it does so indirectly, via the serving of other
interests which are its primary goal, as in the case of education and employment.
Health care services and public health measures satisfy this criterion, but the social
determinants of health typically do not.
One cannot, therefore, infer that the right not to be tortured or the right against
degrading treatment are incorporated in the right to health, since these rights are not
properly understood as having some specific connection with the provision of health
care or public health measures.8 However, it is not always straightforward to draw
clear lines between different human rights. Sometimes the boundaries will be
blurred, and there will occasionally be tolerable overlaps in the scopes of rights. For
example, the provision of training in first aid, or of health education more generally,
might plausibly come under both the rights to health and to education. In
consequence, it may sometimes be that the identical course of conduct constitutes a
violation, or a fulfilment, of more than one human right. Often, laws will need to
draw sharp lines between human rights so that overlaps can be avoided, where this
would be beneficial in some way. We offer no general prescription for resolving
these difficulties of line-drawing in a principled way, beyond the remarks about
holism and primary and direct goals. What we have suggested, instead, is that the
starting-point in delineating the human right to health has to be different from that
adopted by the radical ‘inclusive’ view. That right, like all others, needs to be
individuated by reference to the subject matter of the obligations associated with it.
It might be objected that the rejection of the radical inclusivity thesis expresses
little more than a preference for tidy normative housekeeping. But this is not so: it
also underwrites the idea that there are a number of fairly specific and irreducibly
distinct human rights, so that enumerating a list of rights such as that in the
Universal Declaration is a meaningful endeavour. It further caters to the idea that
separating out various human rights is the best way of highlighting distinct
normative concerns that might otherwise be obscured. It is worth underlining a
significant practical pay-off of the approach we advocate. If one follows the
radically ‘inclusive’ account to the right to health, then one faces a needlessly
Herculean task when assessing the extent to which the right to health is being
fulfilled globally. This is because the extent to which all health-enhancing rights are
fulfilled will then need to be tracked. Progress towards such a massively sprawling
goal is hard to monitor, and extremely difficult to achieve. This inevitably breeds
uncertainty, frustration and despair. If one wishes to set a more determinate and
manageable but still demanding task, then one should adopt the more constrained
interpretation of the right to health.
It is clear, on the view we have developed above, that global health policy cannot
be exclusively responsive to the right to health. This is so even if attention is
confined to human rights that further the interest in health, as opposed to merely
placing constraints on how it may be furthered. Other human rights are also
extremely relevant, such as the rights to life, physical security, religious freedom,
8 For a similar interpretation of ‘the human right to health care’, see [25, pp. 205–206]. However, the
authors erroneously suppose that the human right to health exclusively reflects our interest in health [25,
p. 206].
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privacy, education, work, and so on. Indeed, as noted earlier, if one’s main concern
is with the promotion of health overall, securing a right such as that of the right to
education may be more important than other health-care related rights, such as the
right to a minimum level of health insurance. Adopting an overly ‘inclusive’
interpretation of the right to health threatens to obscure the vital independent role
these other rights must play in shaping global health policy.
Content specification
The preceding discussion of the fallacy of radical inclusivity concerned mainly the
individuation of the human right to health at an abstract level: the question of how it
is to be distinguished from other human rights. But a deeper problem concerns the
specification of its content, i.e., the content of the obligations associated with that
right, even after their general subject matter has been identified. This is a difficult
and many-sided topic, and here it is only possible to offer a few comments. Recall
that a human right exists when, in the case of each human being, universal human
interests generate obligations on others to respect, protect, and promote those
interests in various ways. Obligations, or duties, are categorical and exclusionary
reasons for action, non-compliance with which is a pro tanto basis for assigning
blame (on the part of others) and experiencing guilt or self-blame (on the part of the
duty violator).
It is a challenging task to articulate, in a general way, the conditions that need to
be satisfied for the threshold from interests to duties to be crossed. However, at least
two dimensions of this threshold are worth highlighting: possibility and burden.
Both go some way towards unpacking the maxim ‘ought implies can’.9 On the one
hand, an obligation will only arise when it is generally possible to comply with the
counterpart duty in the case of all the supposed right-holders. The impossibility that
prevents a duty arising may be of different sorts, ranging from logical impossibility
to practical impossibility given fixed conditions of contemporary life. Taking an
illustration of the latter kind, there may be inadequate resources now or in the
foreseeable future to fulfil a proposed right for each individual human being. This
would rule out, on any literal reading, a human right to health that imposed a duty to
secure for all ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’.10
Understood as an absolute standard, it is impossible to bring all human beings to this
very high standard, irrespective of the vagaries of their personal history and genetic
constitution. But this supposed right is also ruled out by a more complex reason,
even if what is ‘attainable’ is relativized to the history and genetic make-up of the
individual right-holder. This is the fact that the state of one’s health depends not
only on what others do but also on decisions made by the right-holder. It seems that
the relativized right would require unacceptable interventions in the right-holder’s
life, overriding their own health-affecting choices on matters such as diet, exercise,
leisure activities, occupational choice, and so on. This would thwart the autonomy
9 For a fuller account of the threshold, see [17].
10 See article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [26].
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interests of the right-holder in ways that would preclude such a duty from arising.
The content of the right might then be further weakened, so that it creates, for
example, a duty to afford access primarily to the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health care, rather than health itself. This would leave the
decision of whether or not to access such care largely to the discretion of the right-
holder.
But even if a pro tanto case for such a demanding right to health could be made, it
will very likely be defeated once the second dimension of the threshold is factored in.
This is the dimension of burden, which registers the costs of affirming the right in
relation to the interests of duty-bearers, the fulfilment of other human rights, as well as
other values, such as respect for non-human nature. The right to health that arises from
this process will, in all likelihood, be far less demanding than a right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health care, which is manifestly too costly.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that ‘cost’ here is not a simple function of the
real worldmarket price of variousmedical services and public healthmeasures. So, for
example, one cannot simply take as given the market price that pharmaceutical
companies, exploiting their market position and the rights afforded to them by
intellectual property law, actually charge for their products. Equally, the cost cannot
simply be a matter of the emotional strain and its consequences that compliance with
the putative duty would entail, irrespective of the origin and nature of that strain. So,
for example, the racist sentiments that make it ‘burdensome’, in some sense, for racists
to conform with the rights of members of groups they despise do not bear on the
question of whether members of those groups genuinely possess those rights. To take
the racists’ burden into account would be to infect our thinking about which human
rights people actually possess with their false beliefs about the relative moral standing
of human beings. However, costs of both sorts might figure in deciding whether and
how, all things considered, to insist on compliance with the rights in question.
The specification of the content of the human right to health is evidently a
formidably complex matter. In this domain, as in others, a fully adequate
specification through pure moral reasoning is unavailable. Instead, a workable
standard must, to a large extent, be the product of social decision-making, whether
conventional or legal. This is especially so when addressing the difficult questions
of priority-setting in the use of limited resources. Of course, any such specification
through social fiat must operate within tolerably determinate parameters set by
moral reasoning.11 However, taking this line of thought much further, some
theorists have responded to the problem of indeterminacy of content by appealing to
a procedural criterion: the content of the human right to health will be largely fixed
through fair processes of (in particular, democratic) decision-making.12 Of course,
11 On the process of determinatio through which law gives specific content to objective moral
requirements, see [1, pp. 284–289].
12 Daniels, for example, has characterised the human right to health as ‘‘implying entitlements that
individuals have to a socially relative array of services (in the case of healthcare) that is the outcome of a
process of fair deliberation under reasonable resource constraints’’ [27, p. 134]. The point is developed
with regard to priority setting in [28]. For the claim that democratic states should be largely exempted
from the authority of international human rights institutions when it comes to specifying the content of the
human right to health, at least with respect to their own citizens, see [25].
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the question of what counts as a fair or democratic procedure is itself a contested
matter. Bracketing that concern, it is still worth distinguishing at least two general
roles for which such a procedure may be invoked.
The first is that of serving as a reliable epistemic guide to the actual content of the
human right to health. But, if so, we need independent reasons for believing that
procedures of the relevant sort are more likely to lead to correct specifications of
that right than other procedures, such as judicial review or executive directives.
Perhaps some of these reasons will be found in general epistemic virtues typically
possessed by democratic institutions, such as inclusiveness in the range of interests
and perspectives taken into account in law-making. However, it is doubtful that we
can have confidence in a given decision-making process to specify the content of the
right to health unless we have a prior, albeit incomplete, grip on the content of that
right, and on pain of circularity, this grip cannot merely consist in the fact that the
putative content was the outcome of that kind of process. In short, even granting its
main premises, the epistemic appeal to procedure is by no means a comprehensive
solution to the problem of content specification.
The second role decision-making procedures might perform is that of conferring
legitimacy on any given legal specification of the right to health that they generates.
Even if the content specified by law is not (obviously) correct as a matter of moral
logic, that law may nonetheless be binding on its purported subjects in virtue, say, of
its democratic pedigree. The first point to be made here is that the connection
between procedure, including democratic procedures, and political legitimacy is not
quite as straightforward as is often assumed. Contrary to a common view, it can be
doubted whether democracy is generally either a necessary or a sufficient condition
of legitimacy [29]. But the second, and more salient, point for present purposes is
that the appeal to legitimacy effectively changes the subject. One is no longer
addressing the original question—what is the content of the human right to health?
Instead, one is asking a different question, namely, when is a law purporting to enact
that right binding on its subjects? This latter question is certainly important, and it is
also true that some of the indeterminacy surrounding the first question may be, as a
practical matter, dispelled at the level of the second question. Nevertheless, in
moving to the second question the focus has shifted from the requirements of justice
to the legitimacy of law.
Justice as the common good
Imagine a world in which the human rights of all people were fully realised. Could
there nonetheless be grave health deficits in this world? The answer, it seems, is
clearly ‘yes’. It follows, at least presumptively, that global health policy must attend
to more than just securing people’s human rights.13 One potential health deficit in a
human rights utopia is a high prevalence of obesity arising from the readily
13 The idea that global health policy should be exclusively grounded in human rights (and in the human
right to health in particular) animates the proposal for a framework convention on global health advanced
by Gostin et al. [30, 31].
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avoidable failure of people to maintain a healthy diet and exercise regimen. This
could lead to severe health problems, but it would be a stretch to suppose that they
are also necessarily human rights problems. Human rights are about how we treat
others, not how we treat ourselves. In avoidably neglecting my health, I do not
violate my own rights. On the contrary, I may be exercising my rights when I freely
engage in unhealthy behaviour, such as smoking, over-eating, and avoiding
exercise, knowing the risks and having viable alternatives. So, global health policy
must be concerned with the reasons people have to promote their own health,
including their duties to do so, and not just with human rights.
Another way health deficits might creep into a human rights utopia is if it is too
demanding or intrusive for certain kinds of health-enhancing behaviour to be
claimable as a matter of individual right. Consider someone in dire need of a kidney
transplant. Although being given a matching kidney would certainly promote this
person’s health interests, it is very doubtful that she has a right to another’s healthy
kidney. This is because their interest in a kidney transplant is insufficient, by itself,
to impose an obligation upon another to provide the organ for this purpose. Indeed,
the right to bodily security stands in the way of others having a right to one’s
kidney. Or consider participation in clinical trials. There are familiar difficulties in
recruiting a sufficient number of trial participants in wealthier countries, something
that in turn hampers valuable medical research. Yet, one normally should not
suppose that anyone’s human right is being violated when people refrain from
participating in clinical trials. Instead, it seems more natural to suppose that there is
a human right of non-participation.
To clarify, we are not advancing the manifestly false thesis that obesity, organ
donation, and research participation are utterly devoid of a human rights dimension.
Certainly, people have a human right to such things as access to a healthy diet and
treatment for obesity. But the incidence of obesity does not necessarily betoken a
rights violation, something signalled by the fact that in the developing world, it is a
condition more prevalent among those of a higher socio-economic status [32]. Also,
there are presumably human rights-based obligations to facilitate organ donation
and research participation and to offer or conduct them without discrimination,
exploitation, or undue cost. But even when these demands are fully met, problems
of obesity, lack of organs for transplant, and low research participation may
nonetheless persist. Consequently, more than just human rights will be required to
guide health policy in formulating and addressing these problems.
Global health policy must therefore include in its mission promoting compliance
with various health-related norms, including duties to oneself and duties of charity,
that are not claimable as a matter of human rights. Now, in the remainder of this
article, we wish to outline a further type of ethical consideration—common goods,
in particular, global common goods—that should also have an important place in
global health policy. By ‘common good’, we do not mean aggregate social utility—
the utilitarian notion of maximizing the aggregate welfare in society by means of a
process of trading-off some people’s interests against those of others. Instead,
according to a broadly Aristotelian interpretation, something qualifies as a common
good if it serves the interests of all in a given community (universality), serves those
interests in a uniform way for each person (uniformity), and does so in a non-
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rivalrous manner, i.e., the serving of anyone’s interests is not at the expense of
serving any other’s (non-rivalrousness) [33].14 A shared language, such as English,
is a common good so understood: it serves the interests of all in communication, it
does so by furnishing all with a common means of communication, and one person’s
use of English in no way detracts from anyone else’s capacity to draw on that
language. In the health context, one can recognize the common good of a social
ethos that both helps maintain an adequate supply of organs for transplant and
ensures sufficient participation in valuable health-related research. Cultivating such
a culture of compassion and participation goes beyond anything demanded by
human rights, yet it is of great significance for the promotion of the health of all.
The second sense of justice, distinguished at the outset, prominently includes duties
to promote common goods.
The thrust of our argument so far has been that global health policy has to
maintain a bifocal perspective insofar as justice is concerned: it has to be responsive
both to human rights, including prominently the right to health, and to global
common goods that bear on health. Now, Gopal Sreenivasan has recently expressed
scepticism about the global health policy significance of the human right to health
[36]. His claim is that, once common or public health goods are acknowledged,
most of the requirements ordinarily thought to derive from the human right to health
cannot be so understood. Instead, such requirements belong to the category of public
(or common) goods. The argument proceeds on the basis that rights and common
goods are mutually exclusive so that ‘no individual can have a moral claim-right to
any pure public good’ [36, p. 256]. We can accept the assertion that much that is
claimed under the heading of human rights involves securing a common good. But
what justifies Sreenivasan’s contention that such claims therefore fail? In effect, his
thesis—insofar as it bears on the position developed in this article—is that the
relevant threshold from interest to duty is not satisfied. In particular, an individual’s
interest in a public good, taken in isolation from others’ interests in that good, never
suffices to impose a duty on others to deliver it. To take his example, securing the
common good of herd immunity to diphtheria through a programme of vaccination
involves the imposition of various burdens, not only the materials costs of the
programme but also the ‘moral’ costs of compelling people to submit to it. In
Sreenivasan’s judgment, it is ‘very doubtful that a single individual’s health has the
moral significance to underwrite either cost, let alone both’ [36, p. 257].15
14 Economists go further and add a condition of non-excludability, i.e., it is impossible to exclude others
(cheaply) from enjoying public goods if they are provided at all; see the helpful discussion in [34].
Although non-excludability is particularly relevant in addressing issues of self-interested incentives to
contribute to the maintenance of a common good, we take as our focus the wider notion. As O’Neill
shows, an emphasis on non-excludability makes it especially difficult to establish the existence of global
common or public goods. Hence her suggestion that it is preferable to focus on goods with dispersed
benefits, the weaker definition of public goods adopted in the UNDP-sponsored [35].
15 This is Sreenivasan’s attack on the variant of the argument for a right to a public good that invokes an
interest-based account of rights. He also has an argument against the possibility of a right to a public good
on a will-based account of rights. We find the latter persuasive, given the inconsistency of many public
goods, e.g., herd immunity, with the comprehensive individual opt-outs (waivers of rights) that a will-
based theory would require.
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Sreenivasan’s novel argument merits attention for at least two reasons. The first
is that it forces us to clarify the interest-based approach to human rights in order to
explain more fully how interests generate duties and how the ensuing rights are
related to the common good. Second, and just as importantly, Sreenivasan’s
argument highlights an ambivalence within contemporary global health policy, one
starkly illustrated by Gostin’s recent book, Global Health Law. Gostin is a
prominent advocate of a human rights approach to global health, having taken the
lead in calling for a global health framework convention grounded in the human
right to health [2, pp. 437–439]. On the other hand, he also places great weight on
public health measures and the social determinants of health, in contrast to medical
services, partly on the grounds of their relatively greater preventive value [2,
pp. 419–428]. But these considerations look like common goods, which may explain
Gostin’s startling assertion, introduced without elaboration only fourteen pages shy
of the conclusion of his treatise, that the right to health is not best seen as an
individual right. Instead, he contends it is principally a ‘collective right’ that
requires the implementation of broader public health and societal measures that are
pre-conditions for securing more specific, individual rights [2, p. 426]. The radical
idea that the right to health is a group right seems to presuppose something like
Sreenivasan’s thesis that there can be no individual right to a common good. But
this is a radical departure from the ordinary understanding of the human right to
health, which is precisely that it is a right of individuals.
So, does Sreenivasan’s scepticism hold up? If his interpretation of when an
individual’s interests suffice to generate a duty is correct, then his conclusion seems
unassailable. After all, how could the health benefits of herd immunity for one
individual, considered in isolation, justify the massive costs involved in instituting
policies aimed at securing and maintaining herd immunity, such as compulsory
vaccination? But the first indication that something is amiss here is that this pattern
of argument generalizes alarmingly even to paradigmatic rights, such as the right
not to be tortured. How could the benefits to any given individual of the criminal
justice apparatus aimed at the prevention, detection, and punishment of torture,
considered independently from the benefits to others, justify the massive costs of
such a system? Indeed, it evidently follows that, on Sreenivasan’s approach, the
morality of rights, including human rights, will justify far fewer entitlements than is
ordinarily supposed. This is a conclusion drawn with alacrity by Allen Buchanan in
a book that deploys Sreenivasan’s insight across a broad range of standardly
acknowledged human rights [37].16
Rather than take Sreenivasan’s argument as revealing the severe limitations of
rights morality, it should be seen as resting on a questionable interpretation of the
threshold criterion for the emergence of human rights. For surely, no proponent of
the interest-based view ever contemplated that the benefits to an individual alone
sufficed to impose a duty to create and maintain vastly expensive public goods, such
as a criminal justice system. Now, one response to this problem is to find ways in
16 The supposed broader pay-off for Buchanan is that international human rights law, which contains
these ambitious requirements, is not best understood as ‘mirroring’ a background morality of human
rights. Insofar as our argument works against Sreenivasan’s claim, it also works against the legal
implication Buchanan seeks to draw from it.
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which the interests of others, rather than those of the right-holder, can work to
justify the right to health, e.g., by pointing out that one’s interests are served through
serving the interests of the right-holder [33]. However, we believe that although
service to others’ interests may bear on the weight to be accorded to individual
rights in practical deliberation, making them determinants of the very existence of
those rights threatens to efface the distinction between the rights-based and non-
rights-based parts of morality. Therefore, manoeuvres of this kind should not be the
first line of response.
Instead, we simply reject the idea that on the interest-based account, the
individual right-holder’s interest must suffice to justify a duty to bear the whole
costs of the relevant public-good securing system. This ignores the fact that the
right-holder is just one among many enjoying the benefits of the system. Just as the
right-holder does not enjoy all of the benefits of a public good system, so too the
justification of his right does not entail that his notional portion of the benefits
justify the entirety of the cost. Instead, our contention is that what needs to be
justified is the right-holder’s share of the costs among other right-holders who also
benefit from the system. Given that we are dealing with human rights, and a
standardized profile of interests that abstracts from certain variations among
individuals, this share will be notionally the same for all. This notional equality
applies a fortiori with respect to public health measures, which are typically not
targeted at individuals and produce highly dispersed benefits. So, the real question
posed by the threshold criterion is, does the benefit of herd immunity to any given
right-holder justify a proportionate share of the costs involved in a vaccination
programme aimed at securing it? An affirmative answer to this question is much
more plausible than an affirmative answer to Sreenivasan’s question.
An immediate consequence of this view is that the relationship between human
rights and common goods is not mutually exclusive. So, it is misleading for
Sreenivasan to claim that ‘no individual can have a moral claim-right to any pure
public good’. On the contrary, some aspects of the common good are rights-based,
in the sense that they include elements to which we have a right. What these rights
confer is a right to benefit from the common good in question [1, pp. 210–218]. An
analogy may serve to illustrate this vital point. Compare two common goods in an
academic department: a culture in which plagiarism is scrupulously avoided and, on
the very few occasions on which it occurs, it is justly condemned and punished, and
a culture in which academics adopt a friendly, highly collegial attitude towards one
another. Both kinds of culture are common goods, meeting the requirements of
universality, uniformity, and non-rivalrousness. But arguably, only the former is a
common good that involves the securing of an individual right as part of its content.
This is because the benefits to each individual of participating in a culture of anti-
plagiarism have the significance needed to ground duties in others to undergo their
proportionate share of the costs to generate those benefits. Now, something similar
can be said about two health related common goods: the common good of herd
immunity from diphtheria and the common good of a vibrant leisure culture. Both
facilitate the health of members of the relevant community, but it is really only in
the first case that the benefits of participation to the individual plausibly impose a
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duty on others to undertake their proportionate share of the costs to sustain the
relevant common good.
Conclusion
Human rights have a key role to play in global health policy. But more than human
rights matter, and insofar as human rights matter, more than just the human right to
health matters. We have argued against a normative monism in global health policy
that operates only with human rights, or only with the human right to health, insofar
as it engages with human rights. Instead, it is also important to factor in other ethical
considerations, such as health-related duties to oneself and duties to foster health-
related common goods, as well as human rights other than the human right to health.
Moreover, the complex relations among human rights as they bear on global health
policy, and between them and other aspects of the ethics of global health, need to be
plotted in order to resist, in particular, the dogma that human rights and common
goods are mutually exclusive and fundamentally antagonistic. In this way, human
rights may be rescued from the distortions that they are liable to undergo at the
hands of some of their most fervent and influential advocates in global health.
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